Politella Petition for Writ of Certiorari
vs. Windham Southeast School District and State of Vermont, et al.
(Tony, Shujen, and “Leo” Politella.)
The Politellas filed the following Petition with the uS Supreme Court on November 19, 2024:
No ____________
In The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DARIO and SHUJEN POLITELLA and
Their Minor Child, L.P.,
Petitioners,
v.
WINDHAM SOUTHEAST SCHOOL DISTRICT and
THE STATE OF VERMONT, et al,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Vermont Supreme Court
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
John Klar, Esqr.
Counsel of Record
Ronald Ferrara, Esqr., on the Petition
Fitts, Olson, Giddings & Ferrara, P.L.C.
16 High Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
farmerjohnklar@gmail.com
ron.ferrara@foglaw.com
(802) 254-2345
November 19, 2024 Counsel for Petitioners
2
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In Vermont, a young schoolboy was injected
with a emergency use “covered countermeasure”
against his and his parents’ express refusals. Officials
claimed “mistake”; the family filed suit. The trial
court dismissed all claims and on appeal, the Vermont
Supreme Court opined that all Respondents are
immune from suit under the “Public Readiness and
Preparedness Act (“PREPA”). The Vermont Supreme
Court misapprehended PREPA’s scope, and the
framework it intends. A decision that defines the
scope of PREPA preemption and immunity would be
very useful to courts, authorities and litigants who
struggle beneath the current tangled jurisprudence,
much of it poorly reasoned.
Under PREPA, “a covered person shall be
immune from suit and liability” for “all claims...
caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting
from” administration of a “covered countermeasure.”
This immunity is conditioned on compliance with
emergency use protocols and all public health guidance
of the “Authority Having Jurisdiction.”
Question: whether the Vermont Supreme Court
has construed PREPA’s immunity beyond Congress’
intention?
3
PARTIES TO THE PRECEEDINGS BELOW
Petitioners are the Politella family: L.P. (a
young boy) and his parents. As Plaintiffs in Vermont
Superior Court, Civil Division, Windham Unit, their
Complaint and Amended Complaint were dismissed
for failure to state a claim due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on federal preemption
under PREPA. In Vermont Supreme Court, they were
Appellants in an unsuccessful appeal.
Respondents are the Windham Southeast
School District and the State of Vermont, along with
their agents. These are: Patricia Walior, First Grade
Teacher; Amy Mejer, School Nurse; Jon Sessions,
Vice Principal; Kelly Dias, Principal; Mark Speno,
Windham Southeast School District Superintendent;
John and/or Jane Does #1, #2, #3, #4, & #5; Susan
Slowinski, M.D., and Dianne Champion, Vermont
Department of Health Public Health Director.
These named parties were sued in their official
capacities, and appeared collectively as Defendants in
the Windham County Superior Court. On appeal, they
were Appellees in Vermont Supreme Court, and did
prevail.
4
RELATED PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1. Dario Politella, et al v. Windham Se. Sch.
Dist., et al, (Vermont Super. Ct., 22-CV-01707 (Dec.
26, 2022, order dismissing complaint)) and (June 25,
2023, dismissing amended complaint). Appendix (a),
(b) and (c).
In Windham Superior Court, there were plead-
ings pursuant to Respondents’ Rule 12 motion. Peti-
tioners do not request this Court review these trial
court pleadings.
2. Dario Politella, et al v. Windham Se.
School District, et al (Vermont S. Ct., 2024 VT 43, __
A.3d. __, WL 3545717 (July 26, 2024, decision affirm-
ing), and (Aug. 23, 2024, re-argument denied). Appen-
dix (d) and (e).
In Vermont Supreme Court, there were proce-
dural and supplemental filings and orders regarding
timing, etc. Oral argument was heard, en banc, but
the transcript was unavailable, when this petition was
filed. Appellants’ and Appellees’ Briefs are included as
Appendix (f), (g) and (h).
5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Barron v. Benchmark Senior Living, LLC
22-cv-318-SE (D.N.H. February 6, 2023).......................31
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)...17
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)...................................46
Bird v. Martinez-Ellis, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 35749
(Oct. 26, 2023, 10th Cir.).................................................24
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971.........46
Cagle v. NHC HealthCare-MD Heights, LLC
22-2757 (8th Cir. August 28, 2023)................................34
Cannon v. Watermark Retirement Communities, Inc.
45 F.4th 137 (D.C. Cir. 2022)..........................................27
Coleman v. Intensive Specialty Hosp. LLC
No. CV 21-0370, 2022 WL17779323
(W.D. La., Dec. 19, 2022)...........................................31, 41
Coleman v. Sharp Memorial Hosp.
No. 37-2023-00033307-CU-PO-CTL
2024 Cal. Super. LEXIS 10893
(Cal. Sup. Ct. March 29, 2024) .......................................32
6
Conyers v. Isabella Geriatric Ctr.
2024 NY Slip Op 33661(unpublished)
No. 153668/ 2022, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2024) ...........45
Crupi v. The Heights of Summerlin, LLC
2:21-cv-00954-GMN-DJA, (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2022) .......41
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health
497 U.S. 261 (1990...........................................................51
De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc.
No. 85968, 140 Nev. ____ (Sept 19, 2024 ......................24
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).......................46
Dressen v. Astrazeneca, AB, et al,
2:24-cv-00337-RJS (D. Utah, Nov. 4, 2024).............42, 43
Dubin v. U.S., 599 U.S. 110 (2023).................................39
Dupervil v Alliance Health Operations, LLC,
516 F.Supp.3d 238 (E.D. N.Y. 2021) ..............................45
Elkins v. U.S, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).................................45
Est. of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr. 1,
478 F.Supp. 3d. 518, 529 (D.N.J. 2020)
aff’d sub nom. Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC
16 F.4th 393 (3rd Cir. 2021) ...........................................41
7
Est. of Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC
No. 21-11765 (Oct. 31, 2024, 11th Cir. 2024) ..........34, 40
Goins v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr.
640 F.Supp.3d 745 (E.D. Ky.)(2022)
(aff’d, 6th Cir. Jan 22, 2024)...........................................43
Hampton v. California
83 F.4th 754 (9th Cir. 2023.......................................39, 40
Happel, et al v. Guilford Bd. Of Educ.
No. 86P24, 901 S.E. 2d 231 (NC Super. Ct.2024) .........24
Happel v. Guilford Cty Bd. Of Educ.
900 S.E.2d 666, (NC. 2024)(currently).....................22, 24
Hatcher v. HCP Prairie Vill. KS OPCO LLC,
20-2374, 515 F.Supp.3d 1152 (D. Kan. 2021)................32
Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho
No. 22-55908 (9th. Cir. 2024)..........................................51
Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct.
140 Nev. Adv. Op. 65, 86214 (Nev. Oct. 3, 2024) ..........41
Hogan, et al, v. Lincold Med. Partners, et al
Lin-24-209 (Me. S. Ct., 2024)..........................................24
Hudak v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills
58 F.4th 845 (6th Cir. 2023)............................................34
8
In re: Investigation Into Regulation Of Voice Over
Internet Protocol Services
2013 VT 23, 193 Vt. 439 (2013) ......................................35
Jacobson v. Massachusetts
197 U.S. 11 (1905) .....................................................47, 50
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.
367 U.S. 303 (1961) .........................................................40
Jones v. U.S
529 U.S. 848 (2000) .........................................................48
Kehler v. Hood
4:11-CV-14162012. WL 1945952 (E.D. Mo (2012) ........31
Leroy v. Hume
21-2158-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) .........................29, 45
Maglioli v. Alliance HC Holdings LLC
16 F.4th 393 (3rd Cir. 2021) ...........................................34
Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc.,
40 F.4th 237 (5th Cir. 2022)............................................40
Martin v. Petersen Health Oper., LLC,
37 F.4th 1210 (7th Cir. 2022) .........................................34
9
McDonnell v. U.S.
579 U.S. 550 (2016)...................................................... 40
Meyer v. Nebraska
262 U.S. 390 (1923)...................................................... 49
Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C.
28 F.4th 580 (5th Cir. 2022)............................................34
M.T. v. Walmart Stores, Inc.
63 Kan. App 2d 401, 528 P.3d 1067 (Kan App. 2023).... 24
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
469 U.S. 325 (1985)...................................................... 46
Nixon v. Condon
286 U.S. 73 (1932) ...........................................................46
Nowacki v. Gilead Sciences, et al.
2:23-cv-10276 (E.D. Mich., 2023)....................................32
N.Y.S. Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995) .........................................................39
Parham v. J.R.
442 U.S. 584 (1979) .........................................................49
10
Parker v. St. Lawrence Cnty. Pub. Health Dept.
102 A.D.3d 140, 954 NYS.2d 259
(N.Y.2012) ..................................................... 22, 25, 34, 38
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
268 U.S. 510 (1925)...................................................... 49
Pirotte v. HCP Prairie Vill. KS OPCO LLC
580 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (D. Kan. 2022) .............................40
Politella, et al v. Windham Se. Sch. Dist., et al
(Vt. Super. Ct., 22-CV-01707).........................................21
Politella, et al v. Windham Se. Sch. Dist, et al
(Vt. 2024 VT 43, __ A.3d. __, WL 3545717) .............22, 35
Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare, LLC
27F.4 679 (9th Cir. 2022) cert. denied,
143 S.Ct 444 (Nov. 21, 2022) ..........................................34
Shapnik v. Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale,
535 F.Supp.3d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)....................28, 29, 44
Solomon v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. HCS of Long Island, Inc.
21-CV-2729, aff’d Mar. 7, 2023 (2nd Cir. 2023) ..............34
11
Storment v. Walgreen, Co.
2022 WL 2966607 (D.N.M. July 27, 2022).....................24
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.
393 U.S. 503 (1969) .........................................................25
Troxel et vir. v Granville
530 U.S. 57 (2000) .................................................... 49, 50
Turner v. Bristol At Tampa Rehab. & Nursing Ctr.
8:21-cv-0719-KKM-CPT (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2021)......37
Vaughan v. Genesis HealthCare, Inc.
C.A. S22C-07-005 MHC (Del. Sup. Ct. Feb 06, 2024).....44
Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton
515 U.S. 646 (1995) ......................................................45
Washington v. Glucksberg
521 U.S. 702 (1997) ...................................................49, 51
Wisconsin v. Yoder
406 U.S. 205 (1972) ................................................49, 50
Zullo v. State
No. 17-284, 205 A.3d 466 (Vt. 2019)...............................20
12
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1. U.S. Const. amendment IV, 1 ............................ 45, 47
2. U.S. Const. amendment X, 1.................................... 47
3. Vt. Const. article XI, 1:....................................... 20, 47
STATUTES
18 V.S.A. §1852(A)(5) ..................................................... 29
21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(a)(6)(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III)...... 18,25,29,32
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(a)(2)(A)..................................... 25, 26
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d (a)(2)(B).......................................... 26
42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(a)(8)(A) and (B) ............................... 36
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(c)..................................................... 35
42 U.S.C. § 247d 6d(d)(1) ............................................... 27
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(e)(1) ................................................ 27
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv) ..................................... 43
42 U.S.C. §247d-6e(a)..................................................... 27
45 C.F.R. 46..................................................................... 29
13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
85 Fed. Reg. 7316 ...........................................................27
85 Fed. Reg. 18250 .........................................................27
Farrell, R., “Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating
Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions”,
40 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 1, 19 (2008))......................................43
“Governor Phil Scott and Dr. Mark Levine Discuss
Delta, Vaccine Effectiveness & Pandemic Divisiveness
at Weekly Covid-19 Briefing”, Press Conference
Wed., Sept. 28, 2021........................................................18
HHS Office of the Secretary, “Advisory Opinion 20-04 on
[PREPA] and the Secretary’s Declaration Under the Act”
October, 2020, as modified on October 23, 2020.......28, 30
HHS Office of the Secretary, “Advisory Opinion on
[PREPA] and the March 10, 2020 Declaration Under the
Act” April 17, 2020, as modified on May 19, 2020 ........28
HHS Secretary, “Declaration Under [PREPA]”
October 23, 2020..............................................................28
Mascott, J., U.S. Dep. Asst. Atty. “General Preemption
of State and Local Requirements Under a PREP Act
Declaration; Memorandum Opinion For (HHS)
General Counsel”, January 19, 2021..................... 37, 38
14
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....................2
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW................3
RELATED PROCEEDINGS BELOW .............................4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................5
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................14
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT................................16
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................17
A. Introductory Statement ..........................................17
B. Three Years Ago ......................................................18
C. Superior Court Proceedings....................................20
D. Vermont Supreme Court.........................................22
E. Conclusion................................................................23
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI....................24
Reasons for Granting the Petition .............................. 24
I. This Issue Presented Is Recurring, and This Case
Provides An Excellent Vehicle for Resolving
It ............................................................................ 24
II. Courts Misapprehend PREPA Immunity..............26
a. PREPA Immunity is Conditional........................ 26
III. Courts Misapprehend PREPA Preemption.......... 33
a. Only Willful Misconduct Resulting in Death or
Serious Bodily Injury is Federally Preempted.... 33
15
b. States Are Preempted From Regulating
Countermeasures, Not From Hearing State Law
Claims................................................................... 36
IV. Petitioners’ Claims Do Not “Relate To”
The Administration of a Covered
Countermeasure ................................................... 39
V. Most Respondents Are Not “Covered
Persons”................................................................. 43
VI. The Vermont Supreme Court’s Ruling Has
Deprived Petitioners of Rights Recognized
By This Court....................................................... 45
a. Regarding the Fourth Amendment...................... 45
b. Regarding the Tenth Amendment ....................... 47
c. Regarding Petitioners’ Parental Rights .............. 49
VII. Conclusion............................................................. 53
APPENDICES (Filed Electronically)
a. Petitioners’ Amended Complaint
b. Order Dismissing Complaint
c. Order Dismissing Amended Complaint
d. Opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court
e. Order Denying Motion for Re-argument
f. Petitioner-Appellants’ Vermont Court Brief
g. Respondent-Appellees’ Vermont Court Briefs
h. Petitioner-Appellants’ Vermont Court Reply Brief
16
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court's jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Vermont Supreme Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
§1257(a).
The Vermont Supreme Court denied a
rehearing, August 23, 2024. This Petition was timely
filed within ninety calendar days of denial, per 28
U.S.C. §2101(c).
17
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Introductory Statement– Petitioners
respectfully request this Honorable Court to review
a recent opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court that
misapprehends PREPA immunity to affirm dismissal
in derogation of their rights. The issue echoes in
courtrooms nationwide, with differing results, and
this will fester without this Court’s direction.
At a minimum, this Honorable Court should
vacate and remand with instructions so the Vermont
Court can take into account its guidance regarding
PREPA’s scope. However, it would be best to grant
certiorari and restore protections to victims similarly
situated across the U.S.
The Windham Court misapprehended the scope
of PREPA preemption, which is akin to that detailed
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
452 (2005), i.e., it preempts any state “statutory or
common-law rule that would impose a...requirement
that diverges from those set out in” PREPA, regarding
labels, packaging, storage, prescription, distribution,
administration, etc. of a covered countermeasure.
On appeal, the Vermont Court piled further
harm on a victimized child and his family by
immunizing state actors who— incentivized to
pursue federal objectives in a public school — broke
18
the law and breached their duties. Respondents are
not immune. The opinion is erroneous.
The Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling conflicts
with established law and yields a horrible result.
State actors who misrepresent and fail in their duty
to safeguard a boy and inject him with an emergency
countermeasure for pay, against prohibitions —
while usurping fundamental rights and violating
state law and PREPA — do not get immunity under
PREPA. The outcome is unconscionable.
B Three Years Ago - On October 29, 2021,
Pfizer, Inc. received emergency authorization
(“EUA”) from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(“FDA”) for use of its BioNTech in children ages 5–11,
which required consent. 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(a)(6)(e)
(1)(A)(ii)(III). Vermont sought to excite demand by
announcing its funding incentives to inject children
with BioNTech, a month before the EUA.1
1 “I have Directed the Agency of Education to reserve $2
million in [ostensible American Rescue Plan Act “ARPA”] grant
dollars for schools who achieve high vaccination rates. There will
be benchmarks with corresponding awards as a school reaches
higher percentages. Funds will be awarded to schools when
they reach those thresholds....” Governor Phil Scott and Dr.
Mark Levine Discuss Delta, Vaccine Effectiveness and Pandemic
Divisiveness at Weekly Covid-19 Briefing, Wed., Sept. 28, 2021.
19
What happened thereafter was nightmarish. On
November 12, 2021, Respondents held a clinic. L.P.
was seized from his classroom, taken by unknown
“Does” and forcibly injected— under his protest,
against his parent’s’ wishes and without their
consent, and against the EUA.
Oddly, this scenario had been discussed,
just days before. Given BioNTech’s novelty and his
son’s age, Mr. Politella had not registered L.P. for
the injection, and on November 10, 2021, he spoke
with Vice Principal Sessions regarding inadvertent
injection, as he did not want L.P. to receive a shot.
Mr. Politella worried about his son’s safety in a
busy clinical milieu and wondered if he should keep
him out of school that day. Mr. Sessions stated that
there were not as many signed up for the injection
as expected, so there was no risk of L.P.’s accidental
injection at school.
Mrs. Politella relied on Mr. Sessions’ assurance,
and brought L.P. to school. Unfortunately, the
“mistake” that Mr. Sessions stated could not happen
did occur, violating Vermont law, the EUA, and the
Politellas’ parental rights.
When Mrs. Politella picked L.P. up at school,
he had another boy’s name on his shirt. L.P. told her
that officials stated he had been a “very brave boy”
that day at school.
20
Mrs. Politella soon began to realize that her
son had been injected at school, and she became very
distressed. It was so obvious that L.P. feared he had
done something to upset his mother. Not until the
next day did Mr. Politella receive any messages from
Respondents about their error.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Politella grew increasingly
upset, as no one would explain how this mistake
happened. Convinced that officials did not know who
her son was, and therefore were unable to keep him
safe and could not honor specific directions regarding
his care, Mrs. Politella took L.P. out of school and
enrolled him privately, incurring expenses.
C Superior Court Proceedings – Petitioners
filed suit alleging, inter alia, Vermont Title 18
violation, fraud, battery, infliction of emotional
distress, premises liability, and gross negligence. On
Rule 12 Motions, the court held that Petitioners failed
to state a claim for relief for a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction by preemption. All claims were dismissed
without a hearing. An amended complaint alleged,
under Vermont’s Constitution, unlawful seizure2
, and
recited Respondents’ glaring failures to: (a) vet and
2 “Article 11 “unequivocally sets forth a single specific
right of the people to be free from unwarranted searches and
seizures [so] that provision is manifestly self-executing.” Zullo v.
State 205 A.3d 466 (Vt. 2019) at ¶35.
21
train personnel; (b) verify that L.P. was the proper
child before seizing him; (c) ask L.P. for his name, date
of birth or any identifying material; (d) respect L.P.’s
protests, as they took him out of class and injected
him; (e) identify L.P. as unregistered and lacking
the required consent; (f) compare L.P.’s nametag
with those boys, already injected; (g) notice that the
other boy had already been injected; (h) implement
procedures and take reasonable precautions to avoid
mix-ups; (i) exercise the requisite proficiencies,
(i.e., unprofessional conduct); (j) comply with EUA
protocols; and, (k) protect L.P from unsafe conditions
at the school.
The Court dismissed the amended complaint,
ruling that the claims “cannot be litigated in this
forum”, as they arise from “affirmative administration
of a Covid-91 (sic ) [countermeasure] and [PREPA
preemption] mandated the conclusion that they could
not be litigated in this Court.” 3
3 Politella et al v. Windham S.E. Sch Dist., et al, “Entry
Regarding Motion”, (Vt. Sup. Ct. June 25, 2023, 22-CV-01707)
22
D. Vermont Supreme Court- Petitioners
appealed. Briefs were filed and arguments held.
The Court affirmed on immunity grounds. Associate
Justice Carroll, writing for a unanimous Court,
held that preemption arguments were “misplaced”,
and did not analyze them, despite the lower court’s
reliance upon this doctrine in its dismissals.
The Court opined that when PREPA
“immunizes a defendant, [it also] bars all state-law
claims against that defendant....” It held that “every
defendant in this case” is immune, “and this fact
alone is enough to dismiss [it].”4
The Court relied upon Parker v. St. Lawrence
Cnty. Pub. Health Dept to rule that PREPA preempts
“all state law tort claims arising from” administration
of a covered countermeasure, “including one based
upon...failure to obtain consent.” 102 A.D.3d 140, 954
N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. 2012). The Vermont Supreme
Court also relies upon Happel, et al v. Guilford Bd.
Of Educ. No. 86P24, 901 S.E. 2d 231 (2024), currently
taken up on appeal by the North Carolina Supreme
Court regarding PREPA immunity in the context of
a statutory violation, and still undecided.
4 Politella et al v. Windham S.E. Sch Dist., et al, ___ A.3d.
___, 2024 VT 43, WL 3545717, at ¶9. (Vt S. Ct.)
23
E. Conclusion – Petitioners question the
motivation of Vermont and its schools, and have
lost trust in its court system to fairly administer
justice. Congress did not draft PREPA to preempt
fundamental rights and very colorable claims against
state actors who deny them. It intended for PREPA
to embody informed consent and a right of refusal for
emergency countermeasures, and did not intend to
immunize those who violate these strict requirements.
The Vermont Court fails to grasp PREPA immunity,
and its opinion undermines constitutional liberties
under law.
It applies a federal law to dismiss state law
claims against state actors who —while incentivized
by federal funding— violated both state and federal
Constitutional protections.
This travesty can be repeated, and should be
fixed. The U.S. Health & Human Services (“HHS”)
“emergency” ends December 31, 2024, but PREPA’s
declared activation leaves many cases behind. An
opinion from this Honorable Court would provide a
clarifying effect. Currently, PREPA jurisprudence
(such as the Vermont Court’s opinion), fails to state
essential aspects of its immunity and preemption.
Vacatur of the Vermont Court’s opinion is warranted
here, especially as public health emergencies will
be declared in the future, during which PREPA will
apply. This requires a clear legal framework that
everyone could work within.
24
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Reasons for Granting the Petition.
I. The Issue Presented Is Recurring, and This
Case Provides An Excellent Vehicle for Resolving It.
Courts have inconsistently applied PREPA
and its consent requirements, and deny justice to
plaintiffs: in Wyoming, to prisoners; in Nevada, sick
hospital patients; in Vermont, North Carolina, Kansas
and Maine, children.5
Injection of a countermeasure
without consent violates PREPA and the EUA, but
courts still get this wrong— or worse, cannot seem
to make it right. See e.g., Storment v. Walgreen, Co.,
2022 WL 2966607 at *3 (D.N.M. July 27, 2022). This
is “unfortunate and certainly deserving of a remedy,
but it cannot be divorced from the administration of
a covered countermeasure-the Covid-19 vaccine....”
There is little doubt that nonconsensual
injection is an increasingly pressing issue, implicating
fundamental rights across the U.S. The harms of an
5 See Bird v. Martinez-Ellis, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 35749
(Oct. 26, 2023, 10th Cir.); De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc.
(Sept 19, 2024, No. 85968, 140 Nev. ____ ); Happel v. Guilford
Cty Bd. Of Educ., 900 S.E.2d 666, (N.C. 2024), M.T. v. Walmart
Stores, Inc., 63 Kan. App 2d 401, 528P3d 1067 (Kan App. 2023).
Hogan, et al, v. Lincold Med. Partners, et al, Lin-24-209 (Me. S.
Ct., 2024).
25
unconstitutional seizure and medical intervention
against parental refusal become more egregious,
sandwiched between the reckless misrepresentation,
failures and mistakes of school officials and the
erroneous dismissal by the state’s highest court.
Courts fail to harmonize PREPA’s immunity
clause (42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(a)(2)(A)) with EUA
informed consent and refusal (21 U.S.C. §360bbb
3(a)(6)(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III)).
This statutory scheme is ignored by courts,
as in this case, and thus, nonconsensual medical
treatments metastasize.
In this case, officials, without verifying his
identity and without parental consent, seized a boy
at school and injected him. The Vermont Supreme
Court has effectively deprived Petitioners of their
legal right to bring this claim before a court under
Vermont’s own state constitution.
In Vermont and in other courts, Parker
immunity is improperly applied as legal precedent.
This cycle of poorly reasoned opinions must be broken,
and the underlying constitutional error, corrected.
Young children do not “shed their constitutional
rights...at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
26
II. Courts Misapprehend PREPA Immunity
a. PREPA Immunity is Conditional.
PREPA immunizes “covered persons” for
claims of “any type of loss, including (i) death;
(ii) physical, mental, or emotional injury,
illness, disability, or condition; (iii) fear of
physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness,
disability, or condition, including any need for
medical monitoring; and (iv) loss of or damage
to property, including business interruption
loss.”
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(a)(2)(A)
Immunity "applies to any claim for loss
that has a causal relationship with the
administration to or use by an individual of
a covered countermeasure, including a causal
relationship with the design, development,
clinical testing or investigation, manufacture,
labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging,
marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation,
dispensing, prescribing, administration,
licensing, or use of such countermeasure.”
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (a)(2)(B) (Emphasis added).
27
“Congress enacted the PREP Act in 2005
to encourage the expeditious development
and deployment of medical countermeasures
during a public health emergency by allowing
the [HHS Secretary] to limit legal liability
for losses relating to the administration of
medical countermeasures such as diagnostics,
treatments, and vaccines.”
Cannon v. Watermark Retirement
Communities, Inc., 45 F.4th 137, 139 (D.C.
Cir. 2022).
PREPA was triggered in 2020. The HHS
Secretary declared an emergency. 85 Fed. Reg. 7316
(Feb. 7, 2020). EUA products were authorized. 85
Fed.Reg.18250 (Apr. 1, 2020). PREPA gave immunity
to any “covered person” who administered “covered
countermeasures” in compliance with PREPA, the
EUA and all applicable public guidance.
PREPA has an immunity exception: claims
alleging serious injury or death caused by “willful
misconduct.” 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(d)(1). These go to
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 42
U.S.C. §247d-6d(e)(1). If immunity applies, these
claims may be brought to the Countermeasures
Injury Compensation Program (“CICP”), for some
administrative remedy. 42 U.S.C. §247d-6e(a).
28
“In each case, whether immunity is applicable
will depend on the particular facts and circumstances.”
See Advisory Opinion, infra at n.6. “[T]o qualify for
PREP Act immunity” under PREPA, a “covered
person must comply with the public-health guidance
issued by an Authority Having Jurisdiction [“AHJ”].”6
Immunity applies where “all requirements” of the
Act and declarations “are met.”7 Shapnik v. Hebrew
Home for the Aged at Riverdale, 535 F.Supp.3d
301 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), notes PREPA immunity is not
absolute, but is conditioned upon compliance:
a “person must act in compliance with public-
health guidance from the applicable Authority
Having Jurisdiction. [One] that fails to follow
applicable guidance does not have PREP Act
immunity.”
Id. (citing Secretary's Declaration, Oct. 23,
2020) (emphasis added).
6 HHS Office of the Secretary, “Advisory Opinion 20-04
on the [PREPA] and the Secretary’s Declaration Under the Act,
October, 2020, as modified on October 23, 2020.”
7 HHS Office of the Secretary, “Advisory Opinion on the
[PREPA] and the March 10, 2020 Declaration Under the Act,
April 17, 2020, as modified on May 19, 2020.”
29
In Vermont (the “JHA”), Title 18 gives
“applicable guidance.” It provides that a “patient has
the right to refuse treatment to the extent permitted by
law. In the event the patient refuses treatment [then
they] shall be informed of the medical consequences of
that action....”
18 V.S.A. §1852(A)(5) (effective September 1,
2005).
This language is mimicked in the EUA statute.
“...individuals to whom the [countermeasure]
is administered [shall be] informed...of the
option to accept or refuse administration of
the product [and] of the consequences, if any,
of refusing administration of the product...”
(Emphasis added).
21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(a)(6)(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III).
It is also enshrined in the “Common Rule”
regarding informed consent ethics for experimental
drugs. 45 CFR 46. PREPA “merely creates an ordinary”
defense. Leroy v. Hume, 21-2158-cv (2nd Cir. Apr.
13, 2023). Petitioners may “prevail notwithstanding”
that the Respondents are “covered”, if they failed
to follow public health guidance. Shapnick, 535
F.Supp.3d at 321. Immunity is conditional.
30
PREPA immunity is conditioned upon
compliance with informed consent under the EUA.
Respondents did not obtain such consent and were
grossly negligent; they injected the wrong boy. They
failed to take precautions, required by state and federal
law, to avoid this mistake. They did not have consent
mandated by the EUA, state law or the Common Rule.
The Vermont Supreme Court, dismissing on immunity
grounds, supports what PREPA clearly prohibits,
while ignoring what it clearly requires.
The Vermont Court is wrong; Respondents are
not immune when they violated their duty to protect
L.P. It is undisputable that Vermont law, PREPA,
the EUA and the Common Rule require informed
parental consent to inject a covered countermeasure
into a young boy. This is “public health guidance”
with which Respondents did not comply. They were
“responsible for” taking reasonable precautions “to
facilitate” safe emergency use of the countermeasure.
See Advisory Opinion at n.6. Respondents failed to
do this and therefore, they have no immunity under
PREPA.
31
In Kehler v. Hood, 2012. WL 1945952 (E.D.
Mo.) 4:11CV1416 (2012), the court dismissed claims
against a manufacturer (immune under PREPA) and
remanded all remaining state law claims (against
a doctor and hospital who administered a covered
countermeasure) back to state court to determine
if immunity was warranted for conduct before the
administration of the countermeasure (i.e., the failure
to obtain the required prior informed consent).
This is the right approach. Kehler demonstrates
that PREPA immunity is conditioned on compliance,
and creates a question of fact if this defense is raised.
Under Kehler, Respondents’ abrogation of Petitioners’
right to informed consent regarding administration
of an EUA “covered countermeasure” precludes
immunity under PREPA. Many cases demonstrate
that immunity is not absolute, but dependent upon
facts and circumstances.
In Barron v. Benchmark Senior Living, LLC,
22-cv-318-SE (D.N.H. Feb. 6, 2023), immunity was
in question, where the complaint alleged a failure to
follow medical protocols (citing Coleman v. Intensive
Specialty Hosp. LLC, No. CV 21-0370, (W.D. La. Dec.
19, 2022)).
32
In Hatcher v. HCP Prairie Vill. KS OPCO
LLC, 515 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1160 (D. Kan. 2021) (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 28, 2021), immunity was at issue because
the complaint had alleged, inter alia, “that safety
protocols were not carried out”, i.e., there was a lack
of compliance with guidance.
In Nowacki v. Gilead Sciences, et al., 2:23-cv-
10276 (E.D. Mich., 2023), immunity did not extend
to producers whose countermeasure and procedures
(glass particles in the vaccine) did not comply with
FDA requirements (much like the EUA’s informed
consent and right of refusal found in 21 U.S.C.
§360bbb-3(a)(6)(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III)).
The option to accept or refuse administration
is the sine qua non of immunity under PREPA. This
option was denied by Respondents, and thus, they are
not immune.
Fraud will also deny PREPA immunity.
In Coleman v. Sharp Memorial Hosp., No.
37-2023-00033307-CU-PO-CTL, 2024 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 10893 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 29, 2024), claims
were not based on a countermeasure, but “rather on
the...concealment of facts;” i.e., fraudulent use of
hospital procedures, which the court reasonably found
to be outside the scope of PREPA immunity. Id. at *4.
33
PREPA immunity is conditioned upon
compliance with public health guidance, traditional
informed consent and other acknowledged
constitutional liberties of bodily integrity. This case
involves a medical battery, unlawful seizure, and
injection of a child by state actors against his protests.
Reckless misrepresentation by the vice principal
regarding safety or gross negligence by officials is
beyond the scope of PREPA immunity, as these do
not involve an administration of the countermeasure,
because none was contemplated or constitutionally
authorized at any time.
Respondents’ noncompliance with guidance
and the EUA is inconsistent with the Vermont Court’s
ruling that Respondents are immune from suit. The
implications of this holding are noxious, and this
Court should reverse this erroneous ruling and provide
accurate jurisprudence.
III. Courts Misapprehend PREPA Preemption.
a. Only Willful Misconduct Resulting in
Death or Serious Bodily Injury is Federally Preempted.
This Court let stand a decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found that
PREPA’s scheme is insufficient to completely preempt
34
all state law claims. See Saldana v. Glenhaven
Healthcare, LLC, 27F.4 679 (9th Cir. 2022) cert.
denied, 598 U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct 444 (Nov. 21, 2022).
In the Second Circuit, Solomon v. Saint Joseph’s
Hospital HCS of Long Island, Inc. (21-CV-2729,
affirmed March 7, 2023 (2nd Cir. 2023)) holds that
“state-law claims are not completely preempted.” It
is settled: PREPA preemption is not complete. This
“is in line with every other Court of Appeals that has
addressed the issue.” Id.
8
State courts should hear
claims as are raised in this case, particularly those
on constitutional grounds.
Federal courts recognize that “nothing in the
PREP Act suggests that Congress was attempting
to eliminate state-law causes of action for non-
immunized claims.” Solomon at 62 F.4th 61. Parker
erroneously holds that all state law claims are
completely preempted. This has led to unjust,
unconstitutional results, as witnessed in this case.
8 Maglioli v. Alliance HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393
(3rd Cir. 2021); Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580
(5th Cir. 2022); Hudak v. Elmcroft, 58 F.4th 845 (6th Cir. 2023);
Martin v. Petersen Health Ops., LLC, 37 F.4th 1210 (7th Cir.
2022); Cagle v. NHC HealthCare, LLC, 22-2757 (8th Cir, 2023);
Est. of Schleider v. GVDB Ops, LLC, No. 21-11765 (11th Cir.,
October 31, 2024).
35
It is settled that “the only exclusive federal
cause of action established” under PREPA is “willful
misconduct” found in 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(c). Id.
Vermont recognizes the “presumption that the
power of the state has not been superseded by a
federal act, and that a “party seeking to overcome
this presumption bears a heavy burden." In re
Investigation Into Regulation Of Voice Over Internet
Protocol Services., 2013 VT 23 at ¶14, 193 Vt. 439
(2013).
Yet, the Vermont Court ignores that
presumption to opine that when PREPA “immunizes
a defendant, [it] bars all state-law claims against
that defendant....” Politella, 2024 VT 43, 2024 WL
3546717, pg. 6. This misstates the law; PREPA
immunity (where applicable and based upon
compliance) only preempts claims within the ambit
of the Act for product liability and related claims,
not traditional torts uncontemplated by PREPA’s
purpose or its express language. PREPA preempts
only one cause of action and state courts should
have this basic principle set down for all to see and
understand in very clear terms. Until then, unjust
results, as seen in this case, will proliferate.
36
b. States Are Preempted From Regulating
Countermeasures, Not From Hearing State Law
Claims.
PREPA’s preemption provision states that
during the effective period of a declared public health
emergency:
“[N]o State...may establish, enforce, or
continue in effect with respect to a covered
countermeasure any provision of law or legal
requirement that—
(A) is different from, or is in conflict with, any
requirement applicable under this section;
and
(B) relates to the design, development,
clinical testing or investigation, formulation,
manufacture, distribution, sale, donation,
purchase, marketing, promotion, packaging,
labeling, licensing, use, any other aspect
of safety or efficacy, or the prescribing,
dispensing, or administration by qualified
persons of the covered countermeasure, or
to any matter included in a requirement
applicable to the covered countermeasure
under this section or any other provision of
this chapter ....”
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(8)(A) & (B).
37
Given this Court’s plurality opinions
regarding the federal preemption issue, this much is
clear: Petitioners’ state law claims are not expressly
preempted by the Act.
Courts recognize that PREPA does not
preempt claims, but preempts state requirements
for the design, development, etc., of “covered
countermeasures.” PREPA preempts state
implementation of “different standards regarding”
their “administration or use.” Turner v. The Bristol
At Tampa Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., 8:21-cv-0719-
KKM-CPT (M.D. Fla. Sep 20, 2021). PREPA “only
addresses” a state’s “ability to ‘establish, enforce,
or continue in effect’” any “requirement concerning
covered countermeasures.” Id. This language is
not novel; many statutes incorporate substantially
similar phrasing. The language “does not address
private causes of action arising under state law." Id.
(Emphasis added).
The U.S. Department of Justice parsed this
language:
“We conclude that the Act expressly preempts
state and local requirements to the extent
that they would effectively prohibit qualifying
38
pharmacists from ordering and administering
Covid-19 tests and vaccines authorized by the
Secretary’s declaration.”9
“...we think it evident under the statute that
the Secretary had the authority to act quickly
to expand the number of covered persons who
may administer necessary countermeasures
to deal with that crisis, and Congress specified
that state or local health officials lack authority
to take measures that would conflict with such
an action.” Id. (emphasis added.)
It is useful to note that the actions of “state or
local health officials” are barred; not claims, courts
or plaintiffs. Petitioners’ state law claims are not
expressly preempted.
The Parker Court was mistaken when it held
“that Congress intended to preempt all state law
tort claims... including one based upon a defendant’s
failure to obtain consent.” Parker at 954 N.Y.S. 2d 262.
Parker is poorly reasoned, yet endures since 2012. This
flawed precedent ‘snowballs’ into other venues, like the
Vermont Supreme Court, to deprive plaintiffs of their
9 Mascott, J., U.S. Deputy Asst. Attorney “General
Preemption of State and Local Requirements Under a PREP
Act Declaration; Memorandum Opinion For the (HHS) General
Counsel”, January 19, 2021.
39
legal remedies. This Court could provide certainty
regarding the limited scope of PREPA’s preemption
and conditional immunity scheme, to prevent further
injustices, as are witnessed in this case.
This Honorable Court should vacate the
Vermont Court’s decision, as it construes PREPA
beyond Congress’ intent and nullifies state law
protecting informed medical consent, fundamental
liberties, parental rights and bodily autonomy. This
Court should reverse and remand to the Vermont
Court with instructions to apply PREPA, so that proper
constitutional limits and state sovereignty apply.
IV. Petitioners’ Claims Do Not “Relate To” The
Administration Of A Covered Countermeasure.
PREPA immunity revolves around “claims for
loss relating to' administration of a countermeasure,
and this Court “singled out” the phrase “relate to”
as particularly sensitive to context.'” Hampton v.
State of California, 83 F.4th 754, 764 (9th Cir. 2023)
(citing Dubin v. U.S., 599 U.S. 110, 143 S. Ct. 1557,
1565 (2023). “That the phrase refers to a relationship
or nexus of some kind is clear.... [y]et the kind of
relationship required, its nature and strength, will
be informed by [its] context." Id. (citing N.Y.S.
40
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
“It is not enough that some countermeasure's
use could be described as relating to the events
underpinning the claim in some broad sense." Hampton
at 83 F.4th 764.
Respondents are not entitled to PREPA
immunity, which requires “causal relationship” to a
countermeasure. See, e.g., Manyweather v. Woodlawn
Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2022);
Estate of Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC, No.
21-11765 (October 31, 2024, 11th Cir. 2024). Pirotte
v. HCP Prairie Vill. KS OPCO LLC, 580 F. Supp. 3d
1012, 1023–24 (D. Kan. 2022).
When considered in context “‘relating to’ takes
on a more targeted meaning.” Hampton, supra at 83
F.4th 764 (citing McDonnell v. U.S., 579 U.S. 550, 568-
69, 136 S.Ct. 2355 (2016)) "A word is known by the
company it keeps." (Id. citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579 (1961))). The
phrases "caused by," "arising out of," and "resulting
from — all connote some type of causal relationship.”
Id. A direct connection is required.
Petitioners do not allege loss from
“administration” of a countermeasure, but rather sue
as parents seeking to hold state actors liable within the
41
“context” of their enumerated failures, ((a) through (k)
in their Amended Complaint) to protect L.P. on school
premises, and for unlawfully seizing him. Cf. "Est. of
Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr., 478 F.Supp.
3d. 518, 529 (D.N.J. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Maglioli v.
All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393 (3rd Cir. 2021)
(failure to exercise due care not preempted where a
countermeasure injury is not alleged); Cf. Coleman
v. Intensive Specialty Hosp., LLC, No. 21-0370, 2022
WL17779323, at *5 (W.D. La., Dec. 19, 2022) (breach of
care not covered where injury or death is not alleged).
PREPA immunity does not apply to
constitutional violations such as Petitioners have
raised under Article 11. Respondents’ “general lack of
action is not a covered countermeasure under” PREPA.
Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court of the State, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 65, 86214 (Nev.
Oct. 3, 2024). Petitioners allege “lack of an adequate
Covid-19 policy, rather than a drug or device” led to the
harm. Id. A “Covid-19 response policy is not a covered
countermeasure. To put it simply, a program or policy
is not a product, drug, or device.” Crupi v. Heights of
Summerlin, LLC, 2:21-cv-00954-GMN-DJA, 12 (D.
Nv. Feb. 17, 2022). Respondents’ abject failure to meet
public health standards and protocols while running
their school vaccination clinic is not “a product, drug
or device.” Id.
42
Circumstances in this case involve a marked
“lack of an adequate” implementation, regarding
consent and identifying those who have affirmatively
provided it. Id.
Respondents’ “general lack of action”, regarding
the clear duty to safeguard L.P at school, especially
after Mr. Politella spoke with Vice Principal Sessions
about risks, is not a “countermeasure.” The facts
in this case do not show any causal relationship
between the countermeasure and a deprivation of
liberty by seizure. Nor was Mr. Sessions’ reckless
misrepresentation caused by a countermeasure. The
losses here are intangible (except tuition), yet real; but
do not ‘relate to’ administration of a countermeasure.
PREPA contemplates tort, commercial and
property losses, and injury or death, which are not
the intangible, dignitary harm of unlawful seizure,
battery, or emotional distress. The losses here are
not within PREPA’s “relating to” language, as there
is no harm alleged from the shot. The harm ‘relates
to’ reckless misrepresentations, grossly negligent
conduct before the shot was administered, and process
failures resulting in L.P.’s lost liberty and dignity.
Regarding misrepresentation: if PREPA
immunized deceptive “inducement and sanctioned
illusory promises, then no one would agree to
[participate in such] high risk activities....” Dressen
43
v. Astrazeneca, AB, et al, 2:24-cv-00337-RJS (D. Utah,
Nov. 4, 2024). If fraud is immune, it would invite
“rank abuse among covered entities to make illusory
promises to unwitting” parents and citizens. Id.
The laissez-faire regime that “covered entities”
have enjoyed during the public health emergency “due
to their widespread tort immunity” is “undermined if
the express promises they make along the way were
not enforceable.” Id. Here, Mr. Sessions promised
that L.P. would be safe, and PREPA should not allow
Respondents “to shirk this and any other promise
made...merely because” an illusory promise of safe
premises “ultimately relates to the administration or
use of a” covered countermeasure. Id.
V. Most Respondents Are Not ‘Covered
Persons’
“Close reading” of the statute reveals that
most Respondents are not “covered.” Goins v. Saint
Elizabeth Med. Ctr. 640 F.Supp.3d 745, 756 (E.D. Ky.)
(2022) (aff’d, 6th Cir. Jan 22, 2024). Vice Principal
Sessions was not one who "prescribed, administered,
or dispensed” the shot. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv). Use of the phrase "prescribed,
administered, or dispensed,” in the simple past tense,
refers to an action completed at a definite time—
when the [injection] was prescribed, administered,
44
or dispensed.” Id. (citing Farrell, R.Why Grammar
Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal
Opinions, 40 Loy.U. Chi. L.J. 1, 19 (2008)).
When the injection was administered is
important; a “covered person” is not “covered”, ex
post facto. Named Respondents are not “covered”,
as they did not administer any shots, and all their
misconduct preceded it. When Vice Principal
Sessions misrepresented premises safety, he had not
"prescribed, administered, or dispensed” any covered
countermeasure, nor had any Respondent. Only “Does
# 1 through 5”, who took L.P. from class and injected
him, had “prescribed, administered, or dispensed” it.
As Petitioners argued, the Does are likely the only
ones to be “covered.”
PREPA “does not insulate all covered persons
from suit merely because they administered”
countermeasures. Vaughan v. Genesis HealthCare,
Inc., C.A. S22C-07-005 MHC (Del. Sup Ct. Feb 06,
2024). PREPA does not provide “blanket immunity to...
a facility...merely on account of that entity's having...
administered...countermeasures...” Id. Immunity is
conditional and situational, not absolute.
Petitioners may “prevail notwithstanding”
that the Respondents are “covered”, if they failed
to follow public guidance. Shapnick, 535 F.Supp.3d
at 321. Immunity is conditional, based on facts and
circumstances. PREPA “merely creates” a defense to
45
be raised in a suit. Leroy v. Hume, 21-2158-cv (2nd
Cir. Apr. 13, 2023). The facts will determine whether
it applies, based upon compliance.
The court determines whether claims fall
within the “immunity provision.” Conyers v. Isabella
Geriatric Ctr., 2024 NY Slip Op 33661(unpublished),
No. 153668/ 2022, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2024) In this
case, the “claims pertain only to...failures to act, and
such allegations do not amount to the administration
of countermeasures.” Id. (citing Dupervil v Alliance
Health Operations, LLC, 516 F.Supp.3d 238, 255 [ED
NY 2021]). Thus, the entity “is not entitled to [PREPA]
immunity.” Id. In this case, many Respondents failed
to act; very few “administered” a shot.
VI. The Vermont Supreme Court’s Ruling
Has Deprived Petitioners Of Rights Recognized By
This Court.
a. Regarding The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides the right to be secure...against
unreasonable... seizures...” Vernonia School Dist.
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct 2386 (1995). This
extends to seizures “by state officers” Id. citing Elkins
v. U.S, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960). This
46
includes “public school officials.” Id. (citing New
Jersey v. T. L. O.), 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S. Ct. 733
(1985).
Whether a seizure is reasonable "'is judged
by balancing its intrusion on [the seized person’s]
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.'" Id. (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct.
1391 (1979)).
It is undeniable that what happened to L.P.
in this case constituted his unreasonable seizure
by state actors without “legitimate governmental
interest.” He is subject to the control of his parents,
who affirmatively told school officials that he was
not to be injected at the school clinic.
“Historically, damages have been regarded
as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396,
91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971)(citing Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484 (1932)). It is “well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion...courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.” Id. (citing Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S., at 684, 66 S.Ct., at 777).
47
State officials, in a public health crisis with
a duty “to guard and protect” the “safety and the
health of the people,” are permitted to take actions
deemed necessary. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 28 (1905).
But, what happened in this case had no “real
or substantial relation” to an emergency, and clearly
was “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law”, i.e., the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
Petitioners raised a claim under Article 11 of
the Vermont Constitution for seizure, analogous to a
Fourth Amendment breach. The Vermont Court held
Respondents immune. Petitioners ask this Court to
decide if Congress intended PREPA to nullify state
constitutional rights and use “any available remedy
to make good the wrong done.” Id.
b. Regarding The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States
or the People, “powers not delegated” to the U.S.
government “by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States.” The Vermont Court flouts this
arrangement by shielding state actors’ misconduct
under federal law, which could not be Congress'
intent, nor the intent of the Tenth Amendment.
48
Respondents deprived petitioners of
their Vermont Article 11 (and also their Fourth
Amendment) right to be free from unlawful seizure,
and this Honorable Court can recognize the
dysfunction manifested where state entities, using
federal dollars, violate their own state constitution,
statute and common law in furtherance of federal
schemes in public schools. This Court may review a
state Supreme Court opinion which blatantly ignores
Tenth Amendment principles of balanced power,
fundamental to our republic.
Governance by dual sovereigns safeguards
against tyranny. The Vermont Supreme Court, under
PREPA, finds a “covered countermeasure exception”
to the rights and liberties protected by the U.S.
Constitution. It is not an opinion that should remain
as binding legal authority.
The Vermont Court’s dismissal on federal
immunity grounds runs contrary to the Tenth
Amendment. Under the Vermont Court’s reasoning,
state-run entities cannot be found liable in state court
under the state constitution, statute or common law,
because PREPA states otherwise.
Such an “expansive interpretation” of PREPA
immunity, where “hardly [any type of misconduct]
fall[s] outside the federal statute’s domain,” promotes
unacceptable levels of raw federal power. Jones v.
U.S., 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000).
49
c. Regarding Petitioners’ Parental Rights
Petitioners have an interest in L.P.’s “care,
custody and control.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2060 (2000). It is “the oldest...
fundamental liberty interest[] recognized by this
Court.” Id. It includes a right to direct “upbringing
and education.” Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 399, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 534, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925)).
American society has “a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children.” Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). It recognizes
“broad parental authority over minor children.”
Id. (citing Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99
S. Ct. 2493 (1979)). Beyond the “specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' [most]
specially protected...includes the right []to direct
the education and upbringing of one's children.” Id.
(citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
As parents, Mr. and Mrs. Politella had
the right to decide whether L.P. would receive an
injection. There is no disputing their decision that
L.P. should not receive it. However, their right to
make this decision was denied.
50
There is no disputing that L.P. has received
elective medical treatment at school, without
parental consent. In fact, this happened against
their express prohibition. And, it might have been
a mistake, but Respondents’ egregious misconduct
could not serve any legitimate state interests.
The Vermont Court allows Respondents to
deny the “oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.” Troxel. L.P.’s injection
over objection stripped Petitioners of one of the “basic
rights of man”... far more precious than property
rights.” Yoder, at 406 U.S. 232.
Petitioners as parents, and their minor child
L.P. as an individual, have the constitutionally-
protected liberty to be free from unauthorized
medical treatments by the State. The smallpox
outbreak addressed by Jacobson was very different
from illegal experiments on Americans at Tuskegee.
Judicial approbation of the Vermont Supreme
Court’s determination in this case permits gross
violation of constitutional liberties on both parents
and child, and is a vast departure from decades of
accepted medical ethics.
51
As Judge Collins noted in his concurring
opinion in Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Carvalho (No. 22-55908 9th Cir. 2024):
...a distinct and more recent line of Supreme
Court authority, in which the Court has
stated that “[t]he principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from [the Court’s]
prior decisions.”
Id. (citing Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79
(1990) (“not only Jacobson, but a series of
later “cases support the recognition of a
general liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment”).
...the Court explained that Cruzan’s posited
“‘right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment’” was “entirely consistent
with this Nation’s history and constitutional
traditions,” in light of “the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the
long legal tradition protecting the decision to
refuse unwanted medical treatment.”
Id. (citing Glucksberg supra, at 521 U.S. 724 (1997).
52
Congress did not express any intention to
eliminate such fundamental liberties in PREPA,
nor are these rights implicated if the Vermont
Supreme Court’s opinion herein is duly determined
to be an erroneous extension of PREPA immunity.
The Vermont Court’s decision— by immunizing
Respondents for gross misconduct— construes
PREPA in derogation of some of the most basic
protected liberties in our American society. This
Honorable Court should not let infringement of
liberties stand as law. The Vermont Court departs
severely from this Court’s jurisprudence, and its
decision has the potential to encourage further
incidents of medical treatment of children without
parental consent.
A moral hazard arises where lower court
opinions expanding immunity beyond Congressional
intent stand as precedent. This Honorable Court
should reverse the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision
and remand it with instructions on PREPA’s scope
of conditional immunity.
53
VII. Conclusion.
As the issues are important, and the Vermont
Court construes PREPA in opposition to its own
constitutional provisions, this Honorable Court’s
opinion is requested.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons,
this Court should grant this petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
John Klar, Esqr.
Counsel of Record for Petitioners
November 19, 2024
54
No. _______________
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DARIO and SHUJEN POLITELLA and
Their Minor Child, L.P.,
Petitioners,
v.
WINDHAM SOUTHEAST SCHOOL DISTRICT and
THE STATE OF VERMONT, et al,
Respondents.
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to this Court’s Rules, I certify that this
Petition, drafted using Century 12-point typeface, has
a total of 6638 words, including footnotes, excluding
sections exempted by Rule 33.1(d) This Certificate was
prepared in reliance upon the word-count function
of MS-Word 2021, which was used to prepare the
document. I declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct.
John Klar, Esqr.
Counsel for Petitioners
55
APPENDIX A
VERMONT SUPREME COURT
JULY 26 2024 2024 VT 43
ENTRY ORDER FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 23-AP-237
MAY TERM, 2024
Dario Politella and Shujen Politella v.
Windham Southeast School District et al.
CASE NO. 22-CV-01707
APPEALED FROM:
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division
In the above-entitied cause, the Clerk will enter:
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Karen R. Carroll, Associate Justice
Concurring:
Paul L Reiber, Chief Justice
Harold E. Eator/ Jr., Associate Justice
William D. Cohen, Associate Justice
Nancy Waples, Associate Justice
56
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions
for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vtcourts.gov or
by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street,
Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion
goes to press.
VERMONT SUPREME COURT
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
2024 VT 43 JULY 26 2024
No. 23-AP-237
Dario Politella and Shujen Politella v.
Windham Southeast School District et al.
May Term, 2024
Supreme Court On Appeal from
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division
Hon. Michael R. Kainen, Judge
Ronald A. Ferrara and Matthew W. Goins,
Law Clerk (On the Brief) of Fitts, Olson, Giddings &
Ferrara, PLC, Brattleboro, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
57
Kristin C. Wright of Lynn, Lynn, Blackman &
Manitsky, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant
for Defendant-Appellee School District
Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, and David
McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier,
for Defendant-Appellee State of Vermont.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J, Eaton, Carroll, Cohen
and Waples, JJ.
¶ 1 CARROLL, J. Plaintiffs Dario and Shujen
Politella appeal an order dismissing their amended
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs’ son, L.P., was mistakenly given a single
dose of the Pfizer BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine at
a state-sponsored vaccine clinic at L.P’s school.
Plaintiffs sued various named and unnamed state and
school defendants. We conclude that defendants are
immune from suit under the Federal Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act). We
therefore affirm.
58
I. Background
¶2. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the following.
Plaintiffs lived in Brattleboro with their son,
L.P., who was six years old in 2021. L.P. attended
Academy School in the Windham Southeast School
District. The Vermont Department of Health and the
school district entered into an agreement to host a
COVID-19 vaccination clinic at Academy School in
November 2021. Students needed parental consent
to be vaccinated. Plaintiffs did not consent to have
L.P. vaccinated.
¶ 3. A few days before the clinic, L.P.’s father
dropped off L.P. at school and spoke with Academy
School's assistant principal. Father reiterated to the
assistant principal that plaintiffs did not consent to
have L.P. vaccinated. The assistant principal said
that he understood and stated that L.P. could not be
vaccinated without plaintiffs’ consent. In the same
interaction, the assistant principal said that the
school had not received as many vaccine registrations
as he would have liked.
59
¶ 4. Despite the above, L.P. was vaccinated on
the day of the clinic. An unidentified worker removed
L.P. from class and applied a handwritten label to
L.P.’s shirt that read, “L.K.” and displayed “L.K’s”
date of birth. L.K. was a five-year-old student at
Academy School who was not in L.P.’s class. L.K. had
already been vaccinated the same day. L.P. “verbally
protested,” saying, “Dad said no.” Nonetheless,
clinic workers gave L.P. a stuffed animal to distract
him, told L.P. that he was “a brave little boy,” and
administered one dose of the Pfizer BioNTech
COVID-19 vaccine1
A clinic worker filed out a vaccine
card with “L.K.’s” name, the date of administration,
the vaccine lot number, and the type of vaccine dose
and put the card in L.P.’s backpack. At some point,
the clinic workers and school officials realized the
mistake. School officials called plaintiffs to apologize.
Plaintiffs removed L.P. from Academy School soon
afterward. Plaintiffs did not allege that L.P. suffered
harm as result of receiving the vaccine.
1 Plaintiffs do not name the vaccine in the original
or amended complaints. Plaintiffs reference certain reports
regarding the safety of the Pfizer vaccine in their motion papers.
In their main appeal brief, plaintiffs appear to concede that the
countermeasure involved was the Pfizer vaccine.
60
¶5. Based on these and other allegations,
plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint in the
civil division. Each count was based in state
law.2
Plaintiffs named as defendants the State of
Vermont and the school district, the school district
superintendent, the principal and assistant principal,
a teacher, the school nurse, Vermont’s Deputy Health
Commissioner, L.P.’s pediatrician, and five unnamed
state employees or volunteers. Plaintiffs described
each individual defendant as either employed by the
school, the school district, the State of Vermont, or as
“de facto agents of the State.” Prior to answering the
complaint, the State defendants moved to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim. The school defendants filed an answer
and moved for judgment on the pleadings. Both
groups of defendants argued that they were immune
from state-law claims under the PREP Act, 42
U.S.C. §247d-6d (providing liability immunity), and
2 Plaintiffs pleaded the following causes of action: a vio-
lation of Vermont's Healthcare Bill of Rights, 18 V.S.A. §1852,
gross negligence, negligent undertaking, premises liability, bat-
tery of minor, consumer fraud, common-law fraud, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
61
therefore all claims were preempted. Plaintiffs
opposed on the basis that defendants were not
immune under the PREP Act and it did not preempt
their claims.
¶6. The court concluded that the PREP Act
provided immunity for State and school defendants
involved in administering the vaccine to L.P., and
that case law from other jurisdictions supported that
conclusion. Deciding that defendants' affirmative
defense of federal preemption warranted dismissal,
it granted the motions to dismiss and for judgment on
the pleadings, and granted plaintiffs leave to amend.
¶7. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
containing a new count styled, “Private Right of
Action-Constitutional.” This count alleged a violation
of Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial
court concluded that because this claim was also
based in state law, it too was preempted by the PREP
Act. The court otherwise found that the amended
complaint relied on the same allegations plaintiffs
originally pleaded; in effect, that LP. was wrongfully
administered a COVID-19 vaccine.
62
Concluding that it had no jurisdiction over
preempted claims, the court again dismissed the
amended complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and granted the motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Plaintiffs appealed.
¶8. Plaintiffs essentially present two issues
for our review: (1 ) defendants' alleged conduct does
not fall under the PREP Act immunity provision, and
(2) the PREP Act does not preempt plaintiffs' claims.
They cite cases from other jurisdictions in support
of their arguments. Plaintiffs contend that the court
erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. They ask us to reverse and remand for
additional proceedings.
¶9. We conclude that the PREP Act immunizes
every defendant in this case and this fact alone is
enough to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs'’ arguments
about preemption are misplaced, and therefore we
need not decide today the extent of the PREP Act's
preemptive effect. We conclude that when the federal
PREP Act immunizes a defendant, the PREP Act
bars all state-law claims against that defendant as a
matter of law.
63
We therefore affirm the dismissal because
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and not for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. See State v. VanBuren, 2018
VT 95, 170, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d 791 (explaining
that this Court can affirm trial court's decision on
any basis). For the same reason, we also affirm the
court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the school defendants.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
¶10. We review anew a trial court’s decision
on motions to dismiss failure to state a claim and
for judgment on the pleadings. Negots. Comm. of
Caledonia Cent. Supervisory Union v. Caledonia
Cent. Educ. Ass’n, 2018 VT 18, ¶¶8, 12, 206 Vt. 636,
184 A.3d 236. We will affirm a dismissal order only
when there are “no facts or circumstances” entitling
the nonmoving party to relief. Davey v. Baker,
2021 VT 94, q2, 216 Vt. 53, 274 A.3d 8:7 (quotation
omitted).
64
To this end, we "take all uncontroverted factual
allegations of the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Caledonia Cent. Educ. Ass’n, 2018 VT 18, ¶10
(quotation and alteration omitted). Similarly, we will
affirm a judgment on the pleadings when the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
pleadings alone. Id. We accept as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations contained in the nonmoving party’s
pleadings, including any reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them, and accept as false all contrary
allegations in the movant’s pleadings. Huntington
Ingalls Indus.. Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2022 VT 45,
4 17, 217 Vt. 195, 287 A.3d 515. “The only difference
between" a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and judgment on the pleadings “is the timing
of the motion to dismiss.” Hunter v. Ohio Veterans
Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
B. The PREP Act
¶11. Congress passed the PREP Act in 2005.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to issue a declaration when the
Secretary makes a “determination that a disease or
other health condition or threat to health constitutes
a public health emergency.” 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(b)(1).
65
In the declaration, the Secretary “may specify
[the manufacture, testing, development, distribution,
administration, or use” of a “covered countermeasure.”
Id. A vaccine is a covered countermeasure. Id.
§247d-6d(i)(1)(C).
¶12. During a public-health emergency,
certain “covered persons” are immune from all claims
causally related to the administration of a covered
countermeasure, Id. §247d-6d(a)(2). The immunity
in §247d-6d(a)(1) “applies to any claim for loss that
has a causai relationship with the administration to
or use by an individual of a covered countermeasure,
including a causal relationship with . . . dispensing,
prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of
such countermeasure.” Id. §247d-6d(a)(2)(B). “The
Secretary controls the scope of immunity through the
declaration and amendments, within the confines of
the PREP Act. “Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare
LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 687 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted).
66
¶13. The “sole exception” to the PREP Act’s
grant of immunity is a federal cause of action against
a covered person whose “willful misconduct” causes
“death or serious physical injury.” Id. §247d-6d(d)
(1). An action of this type may only be filed in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
§247d-6d(e)(1).
¶14. In March 2020, the Secretary issued a
declaration addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.
See Declaration Under the Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg.
1,598-01 (Mar. 17, 2020) [hereinafter March 2020
COVID-19 Declaration. Among other provisions, the
Secretary declared that covered countermeasures
included “any antiviral, and other drug, any biologic,
any diagnostics, any other device, or any vaccine,
used to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent, or mitigate
COVID-19.” Id. at 15,202. The Secretary declared
that administration of a covered countermeasure
included “physical provision of a countermeasure
to a recipient, such as vaccination . . . and . . . activities
related to management and operation of programs
and locations for providing countermeasures to
recipients, such as decisions and actions involving
security and queuing.” Id. at 15,200.
67
¶15. With this background in mind, we turn to
plaintiffs’ amended complaint to determine whether
it can survive the pleadings stage. See Huey v. Bates,
£35 Vt. 160, 161, 375 A.2d 987, 988 (1977) (explaining
rule that, for purposes of appellate review, motions
to dismiss constitute admission that all well-pleaded
facts alleged by plaintiff are true).
C. Defendants’ Immunity Under the PREP Act
¶16. To avoid dismissal on immunity grounds,
plaintiffs would have had to present well-pleaded
allegations showing that (1) at least one defendant
was not a covered person, (2) some conduct by a
defendant was not causally related to administering
a covered countermeasure, (3) the substance injected
into L.P. was not a covered countermeasure, or (4)
there was no PREP Act declaration in effect at the
time L.P. was injected. We address each in turn.
¶17. All defendants in this matter are covered
persons as defined by the PREP Act. “Program
planners” are covered persons under the PREP Act.
42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(i)(2)(B)Gii).
68
A program planner “means a State or local
government, . . . a person employed by the State or
local government, or other person who supervised
or administered a program with respect to the
administration . . . of a security countermeasure
or a qualified pandemic or epidemic product.” Id.
§247d-6d(i)(6). An “official, agent, or employee”of
a program planner is also a covered person. Id.
§247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(v).
¶18. As noted above, plaintiffs named the
school district, the State, and various individuals as
defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were
“de facto agents of the State” in the case of individual
persons, or “de facto landlords of the State’s vaccine
clinic,” in the case of the school district. Taking
plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the State and the school
district are program planners as defined by the PREP
Act, and the individual persons plaintiffs allege to
be employees and “de facto agents” are agents or
employees of program planners. It follows that every
defendant is a covered person under the Act.
69
See Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 899
S.E.2d 387, 392 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that
“community group” that administered COVID-19
vaccine to student at student’s school without
parental consent was program planner under PREP
Act), review on additional issues allowed in part, 900
S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 2024), and appeal dismissed, 900
8.E.2d 668 (N.C. 2024).
¶19. Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to consent
and alleged misconduct of defendants in vaccinating
L.P. are causally related to the administration of a
covered countermeasure. As disclosed in the March
2020 COVID-19 declaration, “administration”
includes the “physical provision of a countermeasure
to a recipient,” and “activities related to management
and operation of programs and locations for providing
countermeasure to recipients, such as decisions and
actions involving security and queuing.” 85 Fed.
Reg. at 15,200. For example, plaintiffs’ allegations
recounting how L.P. was removed from his class
and brought to the clinic are “activities related to
management and operation” of a state-sponsored
vaccine clinic and include “decisions and actions
involving security and queuing.” Id.
70
The unidentified clinic workers present with L.P.
while he was injected with the vaccine were involved
in the “physical provision of a countermeasure to a
patient.” Id. Even the assistant principal’s comments
to father about L.P.’s status and his expressions of
disappointment in the number of vaccine registrations
are comments relating to the “administration and
operation” of the clinic. Id. Despite plaintiffs’ arguments
to the contrary, they have alleged only tortious conduct
that is causally related to the administration of the
vaccine to L.P. See 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(a)(2)(B); see
also Parker v. St. Lawrence Cnty. Pub. Health Dep’t.,
954 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that
PREP Act immunized defendants who administered
covered countermeasure without parental consent).
¶20. Plaintiffs characterize the Pfizer BioNTech
COVID-19 vaccine as “experimental,” but they do not
dispute that L.P. was injected with the Pfizer vaccine.
Nor do they dispute that the Pfizer vaccine is a covered
countermeasure. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 15, 98-0: (declaring
that covered countermeasures included “any antiviral,
any other drug, any biologic, any diagnostic, any other
device, or any vaccine, used to treat, diagnose, cure,
71
prevent, or mitigate COVID-19, or the transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom”); see also
M.T. ex rel. M.K. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 528 P.3d
1067, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 2023) (“Application of the
PREP Act does not turn on the effectiveness of the
countermeasure.”).
¶21. Finally, as outlined above, supra, §14, there
was undisputedly a COVID-19 PREP Act declaration
in effect in November 2021 when the vaccine was
administered to L.P.
¶22. Plaintiff’s claims are entirely based on the
alleged actions of covered persons who administered
a covered countermeasure to L.P. during the effective
period of a PREP Act declaration. As a result, each
defendant is immune from plaintiffs' state-law claims,
all of which are causally related to the administration
of the vaccine to L.P. 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(a)(1)
(immunizing “covered person . . . from suit and liability
under Federal and State law with respect to all claims
for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting
from the administration to or the use by an individual
of a covered countermeasure” (emphasis added)).
72
¶23. Other courts faced with similar facts have
come to the same conclusion. In M.T. ex rel. M.K., a
Walmart employee vaccinated a fifteen-year-old in
Kansas without parental consent. 528 P.3d at 071.
The child's mother alleged that another Walmart
employee told the child that she did not need consent
because she was fifteen, which was not true under
Kansas law. The mother sued Walmart under state
law. The trial court dismissed all but the mother's
claims relating to consent and parental rights, and
both parties appealed. Id. at 1072. The appeals court
concluded that Congress intended the PREP Act’s
immunity provision to apply to all claims based on
the administration of a covered countermeasure,
including those without parental consent. Id. at 1084.
The court reversed and remanded with instructions to
dismiss all claims. Id. at 1085.
¶24. In Cowen,v. Walgreen Co., the plaintiff filed
state-law claims against Walgreen Co. after she was
administered a Moderna COVID-19 vaccine instead of
a flu vaccine without her knowledge or consent and
was allegedly injured. No. 22-CV-157-TCK-JF 2022
WL 17640208, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 13, 2022).
73
The plaintiff argued that defendant was not
protected from liability by the PREP Act because her
injuries “could have resulted from any vaccination
or other medical procedure at Walgreens.” Id. at *3.
Sitting in diversity, the district court concluded that
because the plaintiff's injuries actually resulted from
the administration of the Moderna vaccine, the PREP
Act applied. Id. It therefore dismissed her complaint.
Id.
¶25. A case decided by the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Parker, 954 N.Y.S.2d
at 260, bears striking resemblance to the facts
plaintiffs allege here. In response to an outbreak of
the HINI influenza virus, the Secretary issued a
PREP Act declaration in 2009 recommending the
administration of Peramivir, an antiviral drug, as a
covered countermeasure. A vaccination clinic was held
at the school of the plaintiff's child. The plaintiff did
not consent to the administration of Peramivir. The
child was nevertheless vaccinated. The plaintiff sued
the county health department and other defendants,
asserting state-law claims for negligence and battery.
74
The Appellate Division concluded that the
PREP Act's plain language expressed Congress’s
intent to preempt claims involving covered persons
administering a countermeasure without parental
consent. Id. at 263.
¶26. Plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish Parker
are meritless. Plaintiffs focus on the fact that the
defendants in Parker were “qualified persons” under
the PREP Act. Id. at 261-62; see 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(i)
(2)(iv),(i)(8) (defining qualified person, in part, as “a
licensed health countermeasures under the law of the
State in which the countermeasure was prescribed,
administered, or dispensed”). Plaintiffs argue that
defendants in this case were not “qualified,” asserting
that defendants “received NO training” about consent
required to administer vaccines. As discussed
above, however, plaintiffs’ allegations establish that
defendants are all covered persons under a separate
provision of the Act. Their specific training or lack
thereof is irrelevant.
75
¶27. Plaintiffs also assert that Peramivir is a
“traditional vaccine” whereas the Pfizer vaccine is
experimental. To the extent this is an argument that
the Parker court would have ruled differently if the
Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine had been involved instead
of Peramivir, this has no basis in the PREP Act. See
M.T. ex rel. M.K., 528 P.3d at 1074 (“Application of
the PREP Act does not turn on the effectiveness of the
countermeasure”). The Pfizer vaccine was a covered
countermeasure at the time it was administered to
L.P. See supra, ¶20.
¶28. Plaintiffs argue that “the New York state
of emergency was in full swing” at the time of the
vaccine administration in Parker. They contrast that
with the fact that Vermont’s professional or other
individual who is authorized to prescribe, administer,
or dispense such public-health emergency declaration
was not in effect when L.P. was in injected. True or
not, this observation is immaterial.3
3 Neither party has directed the Court to a citation sup-
porting plaintiffs' allegation. We decline to take judicial notice of
whether Vermont had a public-health emergency declaration in
effect in November 2021 because the answer has no bearing on
our analysis.
76
Nothing in the PREP Act turns on whether a
state declaration is in effect. See 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d(b)
(1) (authorizing Federal Health and Human Services
Secretary to issue declaration on “determination that
a disease or other health condition or threat to health
constitutes a public health emergency”). Parker and
the other case law cited above support our conclusion
that defendants are immune from liability under the
PREP Act.
D. Preemption of State-Law Claims Against
Persons Immune from Liability
¶29. Plaintiffs argue that their claims can
nevertheless proceed because the PREP Act only
preempts claims against covered persons for willful
misconduct.4
They point to various federal decisions
concluding that the PREP Act does not preempt
state-law claims.
4 Plaintiffs have not pleaded a willful misconduct claim.
77
These cases are inapposite because they
address the question of whether the PREP Act creates
federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction over
certain health-care-related claims. See, e.g., Solomon
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 62 F.4th 54, 60-6: (2d Cir. 2023)
(distinguishing between “complete preemption,” which
provides subject-matter jurisdiction and "ordinary
preemption," which is affirmative defense). None of
these cases supports the proposition that plaintiffs
can proceed in state court against defendants who
are completely immunized from liability under the
Act. See Solomon, 62 F.4th at 60; Maglioli v. All. HC
Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 406-13 (3d Cir. 2021);
Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, LLC, 28 F.4th 580, 584-88
(5th Cir. 2022); Cagle v. NHC Healthcare-Maryland
Heights, LLC, 78 F.4th 1061, 1065-67 (8th Cir. 2023);
Saldana, 27 F.4th at 687-88.5
5 The trial court and state defendants correctly observe
that these cases are largely based on allegations of nonfeasance
by health-care facilities in the early days of the pandemic. They
do not involve alleged misfeasance by covered persons adminis-
tering covered countermeasures. While true, we think the clear-
er distinction is that offered by the circuit courts themselves: the
PREP Act completely preempts only one claim but may provide a
complete defense in state court if defendants can establish their
immunity.
78
These decisions hold that absent a claim for
willful misconduct, the PREP Act does not provide
a basis for federal- question jurisdiction when the
plaintiff has pleaded only state-law claims.
¶30. However, the PREP Act does contain
an express preemption provision. See 42 U.S.C.
§247d-6d(b)(8) (“During the effective period of a
declaration. . . or at any time with respect to conduct
undertaken in accordance with such declaration,
no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish, enforce, or continue in effect with respect
to a covered countermeasure any provision of law
or legal requirement that . . . is different from, or is
in conflict with, any requirement applicable under
this section.”). Other state courts faced with similar
facts have concluded that state-law claims against
immunized defendants cannot proceed in state court
in light of the PREP Act's immunity and preemption
provisions, including claims based on the failure to
secure parental consent. See, e.g., Happel, 899 S.E.2d
at 393-94 (“We conclude that . . . the broad scope of
immunity provided by the PREP Act applies to. . .
[defendants in this case.”); M.T. ex rel. M.K., 528
P.3d at 426-27 (same); Parker, 954 N.Y.S.2d at 263
(same).
79
We agree and hold that the PREP Act’s
immunity and preemption provisions bar plaintiffs’
state-law claims.
¶31. Plaintiffs have accordingly failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted because
their lawsuit cannot proceed as a matter of law. See
Birchwood Land Co. v. Krizan, 20:5 VT 37, q 6, 98
Vt. 420, 15 A.3d 1009 (explaining that we will uphold
dismissal motion only where “it is beyond doubt that
there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle
the plaintiff to relief.” (quotation omitted)).
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Karen R. Carroll Associate Justice
80
APPENDIX B
Filed: August 23, 2024
VERMONT SUPREME COURT
Case No. 23-AP-237
ENTRY ORDER AUGUST TERM, 2024
Dario Politella & Shujen Politella v.
Windham Southeast School District et al.
APPEALED FROM:
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division
CASE NO. 22-CV-01707
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Plaintiffs' motion for reargument fails to satisfy
the criteria set forth in V.R.A.P. 40, and it is therefore
denied.
BY THE COURT:
Paul L. Reiber. Chief Justice
Harold E. Eaton, Jr. Associate Justice
Karen R. Carrol Associate Justice
William D. Cohen, Associate Justice
Nancy J Waples, Associate Justice
So, was it the incompetency of the Vermont Supreme Court that resulted in the adverse ruling to the Politella's claim or a perverse ideological impulse to protect the interests of governmental control over the State's citizenry? I am so glad that you are involved in this fight--it is a worthy cause, for sure!
This is so awesome John!! You’re the perfect person for this. Go John go!!’
Is there a go fund me page?
This case is a perfect example of we the people loosing our God given rights as AMERICANS! Fight! Fight! Fight!